4rkal/monero
1
0
Fork 0
mirror of https://github.com/monero-project/monero.git synced 2024-12-13 11:56:31 +02:00
Code Issues Actions Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity

rpc: don't display invalid json errors on default log level

Browse Source 
It's not something the user needs to know, and will display
attacker controlled data
This commit is contained in:
moneromooo-monero 2020-04-28 14:05:41 +00:00
parent 77a008f714
commit 78d435a5fa
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG Key ID: 686F07454D6CEFC3
2 changed files with 6 additions and 6 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

2
contrib/epee/src/mlog.cpp
View File

@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ static const char *get_default_categories(int level)
switch (level)
{
case 0:
categories = "*:WARNING,net:FATAL,net.http:FATAL,net.ssl:FATAL,net.p2p:FATAL,net.cn:FATAL,global:INFO,verify:FATAL,serialization:FATAL,daemon.rpc.payment:ERROR,stacktrace:INFO,logging:INFO,msgwriter:INFO";
categories = "*:WARNING,net:FATAL,net.http:FATAL,net.ssl:FATAL,net.p2p:FATAL,net.cn:FATAL,daemon.rpc:FATAL,global:INFO,verify:FATAL,serialization:FATAL,daemon.rpc.payment:ERROR,stacktrace:INFO,logging:INFO,msgwriter:INFO";
break;
case 1:
categories = "*:INFO,global:INFO,stacktrace:INFO,logging:INFO,msgwriter:INFO,perf.*:DEBUG";

10
src/rpc/core_rpc_server.cpp
View File

@ -265,25 +265,25 @@ namespace cryptonote
{
if (!m_restricted && nettype() != FAKECHAIN)
{
MERROR("RPC payment enabled, but server is not restricted, anyone can adjust their balance to bypass payment");
MFATAL("RPC payment enabled, but server is not restricted, anyone can adjust their balance to bypass payment");
return false;
}
cryptonote::address_parse_info info;
if (!get_account_address_from_str(info, nettype(), address))
{
MERROR("Invalid payment address: " << address);
MFATAL("Invalid payment address: " << address);
return false;
}
if (info.is_subaddress)
{
MERROR("Payment address may not be a subaddress: " << address);
MFATAL("Payment address may not be a subaddress: " << address);
return false;
}
uint64_t diff = command_line::get_arg(vm, arg_rpc_payment_difficulty);
uint64_t credits = command_line::get_arg(vm, arg_rpc_payment_credits);
if (diff == 0 || credits == 0)
{
MERROR("Payments difficulty and/or payments credits are 0, but a payment address was given");
MFATAL("Payments difficulty and/or payments credits are 0, but a payment address was given");
return false;
}
m_rpc_payment_allow_free_loopback = command_line::get_arg(vm, arg_rpc_payment_allow_free_loopback);
@ -303,7 +303,7 @@ namespace cryptonote
if (!set_bootstrap_daemon(command_line::get_arg(vm, arg_bootstrap_daemon_address),
command_line::get_arg(vm, arg_bootstrap_daemon_login)))
{
MERROR("Failed to parse bootstrap daemon address");
MFATAL("Failed to parse bootstrap daemon address");
return false;
}