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cryptonote_protocol_handler: prevent potential DoS
Essentially, one can send such a large amount of IDs that core exhausts all free memory. This issue can theoretically be exploited using very large CN blockchains, such as Monero. This is a partial fix. Thanks and credit given to CryptoNote author 'cryptozoidberg' for collaboration and the fix. Also thanks to 'moneromooo'. Referencing HackerOne report #506595.
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@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ PUSH_WARNINGS
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DISABLE_VS_WARNINGS(4355)
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#define LOCALHOST_INT 2130706433
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#define CURRENCY_PROTOCOL_MAX_BLOCKS_REQUEST_COUNT 500
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namespace cryptonote
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{
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@ -914,6 +914,17 @@ namespace cryptonote
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int t_cryptonote_protocol_handler<t_core>::handle_request_get_objects(int command, NOTIFY_REQUEST_GET_OBJECTS::request& arg, cryptonote_connection_context& context)
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{
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MLOG_P2P_MESSAGE("Received NOTIFY_REQUEST_GET_OBJECTS (" << arg.blocks.size() << " blocks, " << arg.txs.size() << " txes)");
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if (arg.blocks.size() > CURRENCY_PROTOCOL_MAX_BLOCKS_REQUEST_COUNT)
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{
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LOG_ERROR_CCONTEXT(
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"Requested objects count is too big ("
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<< arg.blocks.size() << ") expected not more then "
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<< CURRENCY_PROTOCOL_MAX_BLOCKS_REQUEST_COUNT);
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drop_connection(context, false, false);
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return 1;
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}
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NOTIFY_RESPONSE_GET_OBJECTS::request rsp;
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if(!m_core.handle_get_objects(arg, rsp, context))
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{
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